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Operational failures occur in all industries with consequences that range from minor 
inconveniences to major catastrophes. Many organizations have implemented incident reporting 
systems to highlight actual and potential operational failures in order to encourage problem 
solving and prevent subsequent failures. Our study is among the first to develop and empirically 
test theory regarding which reported operational failures are likely to spur problem solving. We 
hypothesize that problem solving activities are especially likely to follow reported operational 
failures that provoke financial and legal liability risks. We also hypothesize that management 
commitment to problem solving, enacted through managers’ communication and engagement 
practices, can encourage frontline workers to conduct problem solving. We test our hypotheses in 
the health care context, in which the use of incident reporting systems to highlight operational 
failures is widespread. Using data on nearly 7,500 reported incidents from a single hospital, we 
find support for our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that frontline workers’ participation in 
problem solving is motivated by some inherent characteristics of the problems as well as by 
particular management practices.  
 
1. Introduction 
All industries experience operational failures. These can include “disruptions and errors in 
materials, information, and equipment” (Tucker 2007: 492) that stem from a variety of causes including 
inadequate equipment maintenance, inspection, and repair (Halstrick and Long 2009) as well as 
coordination problems among and between staff, management, and customers. The consequences of 
operational failures can range from minor inconveniences to major catastrophes. They can adversely 
affect product or service quality by distracting employees from value-adding activities, weakening 
process discipline, even causing direct harm to employees and customers (Tucker 2004). By eroding 
productivity and brand reputation, operational failures can also impair an organization’s financial 
performance (Frei et al. 1999). 
Voluntary incident reporting systems highlight actual and potential (e.g., “near miss”) operational 
failures in order to stimulate problem solving. They can, and sometimes do, provide managers with  
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information unavailable elsewhere about opportunities to improve work systems (Hogan et al. 2008; 
Levtzion-Korach et al. 2008). Incident reporting systems are consistent with the belief that preventing and 
mitigating the conditions that lead to operational failures requires attention and problem solving rather 
than blaming individuals when errors occur (Senge 1990; Institute of Medicine 2001). Such systems can 
span multiple industries (Short and Toffel 2008), but more commonly focus on organizations within a 
particular industry such as aviation (Billings and Reynard 1984), nursing homes (Wagner et al. 2008), or 
hospitals (Farley et al. 2008). In principle, such systems are meant to help organizations learn from 
experience.   
A growing literature that has examined the operational failures captured in incident reporting 
systems has focused extensively on the challenges of encouraging reporting (e.g., Lawton and Parker 
2002; Leape 2002; Tucker and Edmondson 2003; Evans et al. 2006). Far less attention has been paid to 
questions of whether and how these systems serve their intended purpose of reducing operational failures 
and improving operational performance (Gandhi et al. 2005; Farley et al. 2008). A prominent hospital 
executive commented that “the Achilles heel of error reporting systems [is] the flawed notion that 
reporting has any intrinsic value, in and of itself,” adding that “a growing number of incident reports is 
often taken as evidence that safety is improving [although] there is no persuasive evidence to support this 
association” (Wachter 2004: 538). To understand the effectiveness of incident reporting systems, it is 
important not only to stimulate more reports, but also to better understand how organizations respond to 
incidents already being reported, and why they might fail to do so.
1  
Our paper begins to address this concern by examining the circumstances under which frontline 
workers engage in problem solving following operational failures reported to the organization’s incident 
reporting system. Staff involvement in the resolution of operational failures is desirable because staff 
often possess tacit knowledge required for problem solving (Hutter 2001). But there remains little 
                                                      
1 Examining why incidents are underreported and how incident data are used are not unrelated, as underreporting 
might be due to employee skepticism that the data will actually be used to implement operational improvements 
(Ramanujam et al. 2008).   
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understanding about how staff work to resolve operational failures reported in incident reporting systems 
(Macrae 2008). 
We develop hypotheses that suggest that frontline workers are more likely to engage in problem 
solving when operational failures pose financial or liability risk. Responding to such operational failures 
might enable workers to mitigate or even avoid then in the future. We further argue that frontline workers 
are more likely to invest effort in problem solving when incidents occur in contexts in which managers 
demonstrate their commitment to problem solving. Prior research on management practices designed to 
involve workers in problem solving has examined practices employed by incident report analysts, but not 
by line managers (Macrae 2008). We examine two manifestations of managerial commitment: managerial 
communication campaigns that encourage problem solving, and managerial engagement that models 
desired problem solving behaviors.  Finally, we suggest that these two forms of managerial commitment 
might substitute for or complement one another in the promotion of frontline problem solving.   
We test our hypotheses in the context of the health care industry, a setting in which operational 
failures occur often, are widely reported, and engender consequences that can range from inconveniences 
that go unnoticed to death. Although patient safety has always been an important priority in health care, 
landmark studies that revealed serious safety problems in the United States (Kohn, Corrigan, and 
Donaldson 2000) and United Kingdom (Donaldson 2000) focused attention on the need for 
improvement.
2 We focus specifically on hospitals, a context in which many organizations have 
implemented incident reporting systems that collect data on operational failures (Farley et al. 2008). But 
there is little evidence of whether and, if they do, how these systems have been used to stimulate problem 
solving or improve quality (Benn et al. 2009). Our analysis of incidents reported within a large hospital in 
Massachusetts revealed that incidents that pose greater risk and incidents in which managers demonstrate 
                                                      
2 For example, an estimated 48,000 to 98,000 patient deaths annually in the United States are attributed to 
operational failures (Kohn et al. 2000). For context, this number exceeds the number of deaths due to motor vehicle 
accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS, is equivalent to the crash of one fully-loaded 747 every 1.5 days, and is many 
times the 6,000 workplace deaths that occur in the United States annually (Kohn et al. 2000: 2-3). Preventable 
medical errors resulting in injury are estimated to cost the health care industry $9-$15 billion per year, with another 
$9-$15 billion in costs associated with lost income, lost household production, and disability (Kohn et al. 2000: 3)  
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greater commitment to problem solving are more likely to result in problem solving among frontline 
workers.   
Ours is the first quantitative study to examine problem solving initiated in response to operational 
failures identified by incident reporting systems. Our work complements recent qualitative studies that 
have explored how organizations use data from incident reporting systems to improve their operational 
practices (Farley et al. 2008, Ramanujam et al. 2008) and safety performance (Nuckols et al. 2007). We 
extend this research by developing theory that predicts the characteristics of incidents likely to promote 
operational improvement.   
Our research has practical implications as well. We document when workers contribute to 
problem solving following incident reports and how particular management practices can promote greater 
frontline worker involvement. Our findings suggest that the potential for risk mitigation is an important 
predictor of which incident reports will elicit problem solving.  Beyond this, through their communication 
and engagement, line managers can stimulate increased problem solving among workers. Further, absent 
managers’ regular engagement in problem solving, communication about its importance can promote 
more problem solving among workers. These findings can be used by organizations to increase the 
contribution of incident reporting systems to operational performance improvement.  
2. Theory and Hypotheses  
Organizations employ a variety of strategies and tools to improve process quality including ISO 
9001 (Corbett, Montes-Sancho, Kirsch 2005; Levine and Toffel 2009), Six Sigma (Choo, Linderman, 
Schroeder 2007), Total Quality Management (Hendricks and Singhal 1997; Sterman, Repenning, and 
Kofman 1997; Easton and Jarrell 1998) and high reliability techniques (Leveson et al. 2009). Essential to 
the success of each of these approaches is developing opportunities for frontline workers to engage in 
problem solving both in anticipating and responding to problems. Prior research that examines how 
problem solving can improve process quality can be grouped into four broad categories. First, several 
studies have shown that policies and procedures that emphasize quality and safety can forestall the  
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occurrence of problems (e.g., Roberts 1990; Roberts, Rousseau, and LaPorte 1994; Weick and Sutcliffe 
2001). A second stream of literature examines how organizations developed abilities related to mitigating 
the immediate consequences of problems that arise, which makes them particularly resilient (e.g., Weick 
and Sutcliffe 2001). A third body of research has revealed problem solving techniques such as root-cause 
analysis to resolve the underlying causes of problems and thereby prevent their recurrence (e.g., 
MacDuffie 1997; Carroll 1998). Finally, organizations can use information about problems and problem 
solving in a feedback loop to enhance policies and procedures that improve quality performance more 
broadly (e.g., Garvin 1993). For example, documenting and categorizing problems and their solutions are 
necessary steps to learning from operational failures and improving process quality (Tax and Brown 
1998).   
Largely missing from these literatures is a comprehensive understanding of when such problem 
solving takes place and how to promote it. In one of the few studies that addresses this issue, MacDuffie 
(1997) observed frontline workers in three automobile assembly plants to use heuristics to prioritize 
which operational failures to address. In these plants, frontline workers avoided attempts to solve 
problems that would (1) not be of concern to customers, (2) require bureaucratic intra-organizational 
coordination, and (3) impose an ongoing cost increase. In contrast, observers of the Toyota Production 
System have found frontline problem solving to occur immediately in response to each operational failure 
that is discovered (Spear and Bowen 1999).
3 We know far less about when problem solving occurs in 
organizations that fail to achieve this high standard. Like Tucker and Edmondson (2003), our study 
begins to address this gap by exploring when frontline workers problem solve in response to operational 
failures. We further explore how managers can encourage this. Frontline workers can drive process 
quality improvement by engaging in problem solving in response to the operational failures they 
encounter (National Research Council 1996). Specifically, worker participation in problem solving has 
                                                      
3 For example, in the Toyota Production System: “A worker encountering a problem is expected to ask for assistance 
at once. The designated assistant is then expected to respond immediately and resolve the problem within the 
worker’s cycle time” (Spear and Bowen 1999: 101).  
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been identified as an essential component of effective risk mitigation and learning from past incidents 
(Macrae 2008). 
We hypothesize that the propensity for frontline workers to problem solve in response to 
incidents depends on particular characteristics of an incident as well as on the context created by 
managers when incidents occur. We argue that more problem solving will occur when operational failures 
present financial and legal liability risks. Workers will seek to mitigate these risks by engaging in more 
problem solving. We further argue that workers will engage in more problem solving when managers 
emphasize, by exhibiting commitment to problem solving, that problem solving behavior is appropriate 
and desirable. Managers can demonstrate such commitment by (1) communicating the importance of 
problem solving, and (2) actively engaging in problem solving behavior themselves. Finally, we maintain 
that there is an interaction between managerial communication and managerial engagement; they might 
be substitutes, with managerial communication having a stronger effect when managerial engagement is 
low, or complements, with communication being particularly effective when engagement is high. We 
address these, in turn, below. 
2.1. Risk Mitigation and Problem Solving  
We hypothesize that problem solving is more likely to accompany operational failures that pose 
risk to an organization or its employees or customers. We consider two sources of risk that are 
particularly threatening to organizations: financial risk and legal liability risk. 
2.1.1. Financial risk. Because they can reduce operating capacity and even halt work altogether, 
operational failures risk financial costs. Failures that occur within organizations’ most profitable units risk 
the greatest financial losses. Organizations mitigate the consequences of such failures by investing in 
more innovative services and higher service levels for their most profitable customers (Christensen 1997; 
Campbell and Frei 2004). Preventing and quickly resolving operational failures that affect their most 
profitable services also helps organizations maintain brand reputation, which protects profitability (Frei et 
al. 1999). For these reasons, we argue that frontline workers in organizations’ more profitable areas are  
7 
especially likely to be provided with resources such as managerial attention, slack time, training in 
problem solving, and budget. Problem solving following incidents is thus especially likely to occur in 
more profitable areas. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Incidents that pose risk to particularly profitable services will generate more 
problem solving by frontline workers.  
2.1.2. Legal Liability Risk. Incidents that pose the risk of legal liability threaten the financial 
performance and reputation of the organization as well as of the individuals involved. Individuals and 
organizations are thus particularly likely to respond to failures that occasion legal exposure. Professional 
and regulatory organizations increasingly support disclosing mistakes, offering apologies, and remedying 
underlying problems to prevent or minimize potential litigation as well as for ethical reasons (Woods 
2004; Leape 2007). Taking action to solve problems when incidents occur creates the potential to 
decrease the risk or consequences of litigation. Such responses can also provide a substantive message 
that the organization can relay to the media to defend its reputation and legitimacy with employees and 
customers. Self-imposed regulation to mitigate risks can also reduce pressure for greater government 
regulation or oversight (Enthoven and Singer 1995). For all these reasons, incidents that provoke the risk 
of litigation are particularly likely to generate problem solving.  
HYPOTHESIS 2. Incidents that pose more risk of legal liability will generate more problem solving 
by frontline workers. 
2.2. Management Commitment and Problem Solving 
Worker dedication to problem solving can be influenced not only by the risk inherent to incidents, 
but also by the context created by management. Management commitment, exhibited through 
communication and level of engagement (Zbaracki 1998), can influence worker behavior (Naveh, Katz-
Navon, and Stern 2005). Schein (1992) proposed that leadership is the key mechanism by which culture is 
embedded in organizations. Frontline workers look to managers to signal organizational values, 
expectations, and priorities (Schneider et al. 2005). Managers can inculcate quality enhancing behaviors  
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in frontline workers through what they say and do. In this section, we hypothesize that managers who 
demonstrate commitment to problem solving can encourage problem solving responses to operational 
failures among frontline workers. Specifically, we examine awareness campaigns as a communication 
strategy and managerial behavior as an engagement strategy.  
2.2.1. Managerial Communication Strategies. In many organizations, managers sponsor short-
term awareness campaigns that target areas such as safe work practices or employee health. Such 
campaigns seek to command employees’ attention and encourage behavior that improves organizational 
performance (Zohar 2002a; Naveh et al. 2005). Persuasive managerial communications, especially those 
that “arouse enthusiasm by appealing to a target’s values, ideals, and aspirations,” are one mechanism by 
which managers foster employees’ adoption of desired behaviors (Falbe and Yukl 1992: 640). Managers 
can emphasize to frontline workers a particular organizational priority by the number of times they 
mention it, amount of time they spend discussing it, and passion with which they convey their message 
(Zohar 2002b). In response, frontline workers are more likely to engage in behaviors that support the 
campaign’s goals. In our context, this yields the prediction that an awareness campaign focused on 
operational performance improvement will result in more problem solving in response to incidents. 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Incidents that occur during or soon after a related managerial communication 
campaign will generate more problem solving by frontline workers.  
2.2.2. Managerial Engagement Strategies. Managers can use action as well as communication 
to attempt to influence employee behavior. They can, for example, model behaviors they want 
subordinates to emulate. Leading by example has proven particularly effective in encouraging employees 
to engage in discretionary behaviors (Yukl and Lepsinger 2005; Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund 2007). 
For example, when managers take action to help resolve procedural violations, employees are more 
willing to report such violations to managers (Offermann and Malamut 2002). In the same way, we expect 
that managers signal the importance and appropriateness of problem solving by engaging in such 
discretionary behavior. We consequently expect more problem solving among frontline workers in 
organizational units in which managers are more engaged in problem solving.  
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HYPOTHESIS  4. Incidents that occur in units with higher managerial engagement in problem 
solving will generate more problem solving by frontline workers.  
2.2.3. Managerial Communication and Engagement: Moderating Effects. Managers’ ability 
to promote problem solving among workers might depend not simply on the amount of commitment and 
engagement they demonstrate, but also on the combination of strategies they employ. Strategies for 
engaging frontline workers in problem solving might, for example, substitute for one another (Jauch, 
Osborn, and Terpening 1980). Workers who regularly observe high levels of engagement on the part of 
their managers might be unaffected by additional communications about the importance of problem 
solving. But such communication campaigns might be essential to generating problem solving behavior 
on the part of employees who work in environments that lack regular managerial engagement. Such 
campaigns might enable frontline workers to overcome the inertia of low managerial engagement, 
resulting in a situation akin to a “punctuated equilibrium” (Gersick 1988) that creates a short-term burst of 
problem solving activity. Just as organizations sometimes adopt innovative technologies to improve 
operations in fairly rapid episodes, so too can short-term awareness campaigns trigger “windows of 
opportunity for adaptation and experimentation” (Tyre and Orlikowski 1994: 99) with problem solving. 
These arguments lead us to hypothesize that management communication campaigns will be especially 
effective in generating more problem solving in units with lower managerial engagement. In other words, 
these two managerial tactics might serve as substitute approaches to encouraging frontline workers to 
engage in problem solving. 
HYPOTHESIS  5a. Management communication campaigns weaken the influence of managerial 
engagement in generating more problem solving by frontline workers.  
It is also possible that frontline workers accustomed to managerial engagement in problem 
solving might be especially likely to respond to other forms of managerial commitment such as awareness 
campaigns. The success of awareness campaigns might rely on employees believing management 
communication tactics to be not merely symbolic activities, but rather to emphasize core organizational 
values. Managerial consistency in action and communication is associated with frontline workers’  
10 
commitment and willingness to cooperate (Kopelman, Brief, and Guzzo 1990; Rogg et al. 2001). Such 
consistency might be particularly helpful when employees are called upon to expend extra effort towards 
a particular goal. Frontline workers who witness low levels of managerial engagement in the domain 
being promoted, on the other hand, might be inclined to view awareness campaigns more cynically. These 
arguments suggest that managerial communication and managerial engagement are complements, with 
greater levels of managerial engagement enhancing the responsiveness of frontline workers to managerial 
communication campaigns. 
HYPOTHESIS 5b. Management communication campaigns enhance the influence of managerial 
engagement in generating more problem solving by frontline workers.  
3. Empirical Setting and Data 
We test our hypotheses using data obtained from the electronic incident reporting system of a 
large hospital. Few prior studies have investigated the content of incident reporting data because access is 
restricted to protect the confidentiality of patients and health care providers. We nevertheless chose to 
conduct our study in a health care setting because operational failures are frequent and can occasion 
significant health and financial consequences (Kohn et al. 2000). In the empirical context of hospitals, we 
use the term “operational failures” to refer to any safety-related work system risk, concern, or failure 
noted by workers during the performance of their jobs (Tucker et al. 2008). Often referred to in the health 
care context as “incidents” or “errors,” these can include mistakes, inadvertent occurrences, and 
unintended events that might or might not result in patient injury (Liang 2004). Whereas some incidents 
result in harm, many do not as a result of caregiver vigilance or robust patient physiology (Reason 2000). 
Incidents that could have harmed a patient but were prevented from doing so through planned or 
unplanned recovery are referred to as near misses (Kaplan and Rabin Fastman 2003). In our setting, 
employees are encouraged to report all types of incidents including those that resulted from inadvertent, 
unintended, or inappropriate intended actions regardless of whether they were prevented midcourse or 
resulted in patient harm.     
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The hospital’s incident reporting system, a customized commercial database, was implemented in 
June 2004. A dedicated patient safety team of four full time equivalent employees was employed by the 
hospital to manage the incident reporting system and facilitate incident follow-up (among other 
responsibilities). Reporting was voluntary and confidential (but not anonymous). Reports could be filed 
by any hospital employee on computers located throughout the hospital. Reporters responded to a set of 
structured, semi-structured, and free-text questions designed to gather basic information about an incident 
(e.g., type, date, and time), who was involved (e.g., names of patient, staff, and doctors), the outcome 
(e.g., the degree of patient harm that resulted), contributing factors, and actions taken in response. Filed 
reports were automatically routed to a designated unit manager, process manager, risk manager, and 
patient safety manager.
4 Although any of these managers could enter additional information about the 
reported incident, unit managers were primarily responsible for follow-up. Managers completed a set of 
fields pertaining to follow-up and resolution accessible only to them. They were also able to send notes 
with attachments to specific recipients and enter structured and free-text data explaining how the incident 
had been addressed. 
We examined incidents reported by all hospital units between January 1, 2005 and May 31, 
2008.
5 Our dependent variables, intended to capture problem solving in response to incidents, were 
derived from the actions taken following an incident as recorded by the incident reporter and occasionally 
updated by a manager. To document the problem solving activities undertaken in response to the incident, 
the system provided a structured list of both “tick-box” options and a field in which free-text actions 
could be added. The incident reporting system also provided a free-text field in which to describe 
incidents. A detailed preliminary review of several incidents revealed that reporters had documented 
                                                      
4 The risk management department and patient safety manager received all incident reports. Unit managers received 
reports specific to their units. Process managers received reports related to specific incident types, regardless of unit. 
Nursing managers received reports in which permanent harm or death resulted. Finally, medical and administrative 
directors received reports specific to the service line to which a patient had been admitted. Reports pertaining to 
incidents that involved multiple units were disseminated accordingly.   
5 We exclude incidents reported during months immediately following the hospital’s installation of the system 
(June-December 2004) to avoid potentially inaccurate or incomplete data entered by staff members who might have 
been unfamiliar with the system. The sample extends through the most recent date of incidents and associated 
follow-up actions that we were able to obtain.   
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follow-up actions to some incidents in the text field rather than in the structured list. To avoid 
confounding our results with such reports where follow-up actions were underrepresented in the 
structured list, we examined the prevalence of this problem and identified four incident types in which 
reporting actions only in the free-text field was rare: ID/Documentation/Consent, Blood/Blood Product, 
Lab Specimen/Test, and Surgery/Procedure.
6 Table 1 reports the proportion of our sample represented by 
each of these incident types. Our dataset includes 9,758 reported incidents during the study years for these 
four incident types. However, our empirical models (described below) employ a key independent variable 
that lags one year, effectively restricting our analysis to the 7,407 incidents reported January 1, 2006 
through May 31, 2008.     
To assess the generalizability of our setting, we compared our hospital to all hospitals in 
Massachusetts based on a 2008 assessment of serious reportable events (SRE) legally required to be 
reported to the state regulator (Massachusetts Department of Public Health 2009). Our hospital was 
within one standard deviation (1.37) of the mean hospital rate of 1.06 SREs per 10,000 patient days.  
Comparing the three most common types of SREs to the average hospital in Massachusetts, our hospital 
had a slightly lower proportion of environmental events, a higher proportion of care management events, 
and a similar proportion of surgical events. This offers some indication that our setting includes a range of 
operational failures similar to those in other Massachusetts’ hospitals.              
3.1. Dependent Variables 
To examine the occurrence of problem solving in response to incident reports, we created two 
variables based on actions taken by staff, as recorded in the structured list within the incident report. We 
                                                      
6 Budget and time constraints prevented us from individually reviewing this text field for the many thousands of 
incident reports. Instead, we focused on incident reports that had no actions reported in the action field, took a 
stratified random sample of 20 of each incident type, and counted the number of reports in which actions were 
documented in the free-text description field. Based on the results of this investigation, we focused our analysis on 
the four types of incidents in which underreporting of actions occurred least often (in fewer than 20% of the incident 
reports for each type in our sample). Although our primary analyses rely on these four incident types with the least 
measurement error, we report the results of a set of robustness tests that analyze a broader set of 11,930 incidents 
across thirteen types. In addition to our focal four, these include Airway Management, Coordination of Care, 
Diagnosis/Treatment, Diagnostic Test, Environment, Fall, Identification/Documentation/Consent, Line/Tube 
(related to intravenous therapy), Maternal/Childbirth, and Skin/Tissue.  
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created any staff-reported problem solving as a dichotomous variable coded “1” for incidents in which at 
least one problem solving action was taken in response to a reported incident, and “0” otherwise. We also 
calculated the number of staff-reported problem solving actions taken to identify which incidents 
resulted in more actions. 
3.2. Explanatory Variables 
3.2.1. Financial Risk. More profitable services impose greater financial risk because incidents 
have the potential to incur greater financial losses. The profitability of hospital services varies 
substantially (Dobson et al., 2005). General hospitals rely on more profitable services to subsidize less 
profitable ones. Horwitz (2005) categorized specific hospital services as “relatively profitable” (e.g., 
orthopedic surgery) or “relatively unprofitable” (e.g., inpatient psychiatric). In consultation with our 
hospital contact, we mapped this list of profitable and unprofitable services to the locations in the hospital 
in which incidents occurred. We created a dichotomous variable, profitable service, coded “1” for 
incidents that took place in areas controlled by a relatively profitable service, and “0” for all other 
incidents. To distinguish within the latter category services Horwitz classified as unprofitable from 
services at our focal hospital not included in the Horwitz taxonomy (and units that provided a mix of 
profitable and unprofitable services), we created a second dichotomous variable, profitability unknown, 
coded “1” for the latter two situations, and “0” for incidents associated with unprofitable services. 
3.2.2. Legal Liability Risk. We created two measures to capture various dimensions of legal 
liability, as reflected in the risk of malpractice lawsuits, the primary channel through which legal liability 
is manifested in the health care industry (Kessler and McClellan 1996). Liability is heightened for an 
incident that involves a patient because the risk of patient harm is more likely to lead the patient to 
perceive that that mistakes might have been made in the course of her or his treatment, which increases 
the risk of the patient filing a lawsuit. We determined that a patient was involved in an incident if the 
incident reporter populated the “patient age” field, noted in the “severity” field that patient harm had  
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occurred, classified the incident type as a fall, or reported a patient to be in pain. We coded patient 
involved “1” if any of these indicators implied that the incident involved a patient, and “0” otherwise.   
Our second measure, reflecting more extreme cases of liability risk, relies on physicians’ medical 
malpractice premium rates, which are based on the average risk of loss from lawsuits filed against doctors 
in each specialty. Rodwin et al. (2008) found that the highest malpractice premium rates in Massachusetts 
were incurred by physicians who specialized in orthopedic spinal surgery, major neurological surgery, 
and obstetrics and obstetrics/gynecology. In 2005, physicians in these specialties paid an average of 
$95,045 for malpractice insurance, compared to $17,810 paid by the average physician for the same dollar 
coverage. Although our incident report data did not contain sufficient detail for us to identify which, if 
any, incidents involved orthopedic spinal surgery or major neurological surgery, we were able to identify 
incidents associated with obstetrics and obstetrics/gynecology (hereafter obstetrics for simplicity).
7 We 
created obstetrics as a dichotomous variable coded “1” for incidents that had the potential to result in an 
obstetrics malpractice claim including incidents that occurred in the obstetrics ward, nursery, or neonatal 
intensive care unit (NICU), incidents for which the patient was admitted for newborn, newborn specialty, 
or obstetrics care, incidents involving a patient less than one month old, and incidents classified as 
maternal/childbirth, and “0” otherwise. 
3.2.3. Managerial Communication. The hospital runs in early March an annual campaign 
designed to generate hospital-wide awareness of patient safety. During this week long campaign, the 
hospital promotes patient safety practices via the hospital bulletin, a table provided with patient safety 
materials, and a patient safety knowledge contest (e.g., crossword puzzle or quiz). The hospital promotes 
increased incident reporting by giving staff credit in the hospital cafeteria for each report filed during the 
campaign week. Patient safety team members at the hospital report that this campaign often results in 
                                                      
7 Our focus on obstetrics is supported by prior research that has shown heightened sensitivity for pregnant mothers 
and newborns to place doctors in obstetrics and gynecology at substantially higher risk of malpractice lawsuits than 
doctors in most other specialties (Studdert et al. 2006; Kim 2007). Malpractice lawsuits involving child victims can 
elicit particularly large damage awards that reflect higher future earnings losses and a greater sense of moral outrage 
regarding the innocence of such victims. For example, Finley (2004) found that women and children receive higher 
noneconomic loss damage awards. Even when no harm occurs, risk posed to such patients can attract negative media 
attention.  
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heightened awareness and increased reporting throughout the months of March and April. Increased 
problem solving is also expected as a result of the attention to safety. We consequently created a 
dichotomous variable, awareness campaign, coded “1” for incidents that occurred in March or April, and 
“0” otherwise.  
3.2.4. Managerial Engagement. At our hospital, the unit manager is the primary individual 
tasked with responding at a managerial level to incident reports filed by frontline workers. As explained 
above, unit managers automatically receive a copy of each incident report filed in their unit. The 
associated set of manager fields in these reports includes a structured field in which unit managers can 
record the actions taken as a result of their involvement. Examples include “communication process 
enhanced” and “leadership/responsibility defined.” We used this field to create a variable that captures the 
overall level of manager problem solving within each unit. Managerial engagement is the proportion of 
total incidents reported in each unit in each calendar year for which a manager reported at least one 
action. For units that had no reported incidents in a calendar year, we recoded managerial engagement 
from missing to zero and created a dichotomous variable coded “1” to denote such instances, and “0” 
otherwise. In the models, we lag this variable one year to capture the prevailing level of managerial 
engagement within units in which incidents were reported.      
3.3. Control Variables   
We created a set of control variables to capture additional factors that might influence problem 
solving in response to incidents.   
3.3.1. Alignment with Organizational Mission. Many service organizations owe their success to 
a deliberate focus on achieving excellence for the subset of service attributes most valued by their 
customers (Frei 2008). Such service attributes and capabilities reflect not only an organization’s technical 
skills but also its deeply rooted values (Leonard-Barton 1992), and become central to the organization’s 
core mission. Operational failures that put an organization’s mission at risk because they involve key 
services or capabilities might be more likely to elicit a response from management and employees. We  
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developed a set of measures to capture various dimensions of the hospital’s primary mission of providing 
high-quality, patient-centered care. Incidents that take place in patient or clinical areas, because these are 
the locations in which care is delivered, are likely more aligned with the hospital’s primary mission. We 
created patient or clinical area as a dichotomous variable coded “1” for incidents that occurred in a unit, 
patient room, or treatment area, and “0” for incidents that occurred elsewhere (e.g., in a public area such 
as hallway or cafeteria). We also created a dichotomous variable to denote instances in which the area 
was not specified in the incident report.   
The core technical skill and value of hospitals is patient care. According to the Hippocratic Oath, 
chief among patient care aims is “first, do no harm.” Incidents that result in patient harm thus pose a 
greater conflict with a hospital’s primary mission than incidents that result in no or only minor harm. A 
field in the incident reporting system explicitly indicates whether a patient experienced pain as a result of 
the reported incident. Based on this data, we created four dichotomous variables to capture varying levels 
of patient harm: low severity incidents referred to near misses and incidents that did not result in patient 
harm; temporary patient harm referred to incidents that resulted in temporary patient harm; permanent 
patient harm referred to incidents that resulted in permanent patient harm; and patient death referred to 
incidents that resulted in death.   
3.3.2. Equipment. Incidents involving equipment might spur a unique type of action related to 
repairing or replacing devices. We created a dichotomous variable called equipment coded “1” when 
equipment was involved in a reported incident, and “0” otherwise.   
3.3.3. Incident Type. The incident reporting system used in this hospital requires that incidents 
be classified as one of several types (a mutually exclusive categorization determined by the reporter). The 
qualitative nature of problem solving differs by incident type. For example, the types of actions taken 
after an identification/documentation/consent incident (e.g., documentation amended, ID clarified) are 
distinct from the types of actions taken after a blood-related incident (e.g., notify blood bank, transfusion 
stopped). We developed a set of incident type dummies to account for such unobservable differences in 
responses to different incident types.    
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3.3.4. Month. Discussions with our hospital contacts revealed that problem solving appeared to 
vary across months of the year. For example, they perceived lower levels of problem solving during 
holiday months in the summer and winter when many employees take vacation time. To address such 
concerns, we developed a full set of month dummies.
  
3.3.5. Year. Responses to incidents might also be affected by changes in annual budgets and 
strategic priorities, whether the hospital was subjected to a bi-annual visit by the Joint Commission to 
reevaluate its accreditation status, and other differences between years. We developed a full set of year 
dummies to account for such factors.  
4. Empirical Approach and Results 
Summary statistics and correlations for our variables are reported in Tables 2 and 3. These show 
that 24.1% of incidents resulted in at least one staff-reported problem solving action. On average, there 
were 0.33 staff-reported actions per incident. Below, we test our hypothesized relationships between 
incident characteristics, managerial context, and staff-reported problem solving. We then describe several 
robustness checks and an extension whereby we explore the determinants of problem solving undertaken 
and reported by managers rather than frontline workers. 
4.1 Hypothesis Testing   
To assess how our hypothesized variables affect the likelihood that problem solving occurred in 
response to an incident, we estimated a logistic regression model that predicts our dichotomous dependent 
variable, any staff-reported problem solving. Results are presented in Table 4 as odds ratios (OR) with 
robust standard errors (Column 1a).  
We also examined the extent to which our key independent variables affected the number of 
problem solving actions taken in response to each incident. Because the dependent variable exhibited 
overdispersion (mean=0.33, variance=0.59), we estimated this count model using negative binomial 
regression. These results are presented in Table 4 as incidence-rate ratios (IRRs) with robust standard 
errors (Column 2a).
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4.1.1. Financial Risk. We found no evidence that incidents that involved more profitable services 
were more likely to motivate problem solving, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. Instead, we found the 
opposite, that problem solving took place less often within such service areas (OR=0.71; p<0.05).   
Evaluated with all other variables set at their means, our model predicts that incidents that involve a more 
profitable service had a 5.4% probability of resulting in staff-reported problem solving, compared to a 
7.4% probability for incidents that involved other services. When problem solving did take place, 
incidents involving more profitable services were associated with less problem solving (IRR=0.86; 
p<0.10), not more as we had predicted. The magnitude of this difference is small, however. With all other 
variables set at their means, incidents involving a more profitable service were associated with 0.13 
actions on average, compared to 0.15 actions for incidents that involved other services. Together, these 
results indicate that incidents that evoke greater financial risk are no more likely (are in fact less likely) to 
spur problem solving than other types of incidents, and when such incidents are addressed, problem 
solving is no more comprehensive. We return to this counterintuitive finding in the discussion. 
4.1.2. Legal Liability Risk. Problem solving was more likely to follow incidents that posed 
potential legal liability, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. The probability of any staff-reported problem 
solving was higher when patients were involved (OR=3.5; p<0.01) and when incidents involved obstetrics 
(OR=1.5; p<0.01). Evaluated with all other variables at their means, our model predicts that incidents 
involving patients had an 8.1% probability of spurring problem solving, a substantial increase over the 
2.4% probability for incidents not involving patients. Our model also predicts that for incidents that 
evoked heightened liability risk by involving obstetrics, the probability of any problem solving was 9.7%, 
compared to a 6.9% probability for incidents that did not involve obstetrics. This corresponds to a 41% 
increase in the probability of problem solving.     
Incidents that involved patients and obstetrics tended to prompt more problem solving actions 
(Patient Involved: IRR=1.9; p<0.01 and Obstetrics: IRR=1.4; p<0.01). With all other variables set at their 
means, incidents that involved patients averaged 0.16 actions, compared to 0.08 for incidents that did not  
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involve patients, and incidents that involved obstetrics 0.20 actions, compared to 0.15 for incidents that 
did not involve obstetrics. 
4.1.3. Managerial Communication. Incidents reported during and shortly after an awareness 
campaign were significantly more likely to result in at least some staff-reported problem solving 
compared to incidents reported in other periods (OR=1.5; p<0.05). Our model predicted that incidents that 
occurred during campaign periods had a 9.7% probability of triggering problem solving activities, 
compared to a 6.5% probability for incidents reported outside campaign periods, when evaluated with all 
other variables at their means. This 3.2 percentage point difference corresponds to a 49% increase in the 
probability of problem solving associated with campaigns. We found no evidence that incidents reported 
during or closely following an awareness campaign affected the number of problem solving actions taken, 
however.   
4.1.4. Managerial Engagement. We also found evidence that managerial action was associated 
with more staff problem solving. Incidents reported in units in which managers were more actively 
engaged in problem solving were significantly more likely to spur staff-reported problem solving 
(OR=1.8; p<0.01). Compared to incidents reported in units with no managerial engagement, incidents 
reported in units with 100% managerial engagement (i.e., managers responded to all reported incidents in 
the prior year) were associated with a 5.1 percentage point increase (from 6.4% to 10.7%) in the 
likelihood of staff-reported problem solving. This represents a 68% relative increase. When problem 
solving did take place, incidents in units with high managerial engagement were associated with more 
problem solving activities (IRR=1.6; p<0.01). With all other variables set at their means, incidents 
reported in units with no managerial engagement averaged 0.14 actions, compared to 0.21 actions in units 
with 100% managerial engagement.  
4.1.5. Interaction of Managerial Communication and Engagement. To test whether awareness 
campaigns had differential affects on the propensity for problem solving across units with differing levels 
of managerial engagement, we parsed managerial engagement into two variables: managerial 
engagement during awareness campaigns, and managerial engagement not during awareness campaigns.  
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Each of these variables took the value of managerial engagement during the time period specified, and 
was coded “0” throughout the rest of the year. We substituted these two variables for the single 
managerial engagement variable and report the results of these logistic and negative binomial regression 
models in Columns 1b and 2b of Table 4. Throughout most the year, when there was no awareness 
campaign, incidents reported in units with greater levels of managerial engagement were more likely to be 
accompanied by at least some staff problem solving (OR=2.02; p<0.01 from Column 1b), and more 
problem solving activities (IRR=1.75; p<0.01 from Column 2b). In contrast, we found no evidence that 
managerial engagement affected either the likelihood of staff-reported problem solving (OR=1.07; p=0.86 
from Column 1b) or the number of problem solving activities (IRR=1.00; p=0. 98 from Column 2b) 
during awareness campaigns.
8 This suggests that campaigns have a greater impact on increasing staff-
reported problem solving in units with low managerial problem solving, a substitution effect predicted by 
Hypothesis 5a. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the predicted probability of staff-reported 
problem solving at different levels of managerial engagement when awareness campaigns were and were 
not taking place. In units with no managerial engagement, the predicted probability of staff-reported 
problem solving increased three-fold from 4.9% outside of campaign periods to 15.2% during campaigns. 
In units with 100% managerial engagement, the predicted probability of staff-reported problem solving 
increased from 9.5% outside of campaign periods to 16.1% during campaigns. Campaigns thus had a 
much stronger influence on units with lower managerial engagement. We did not find support for the 
complementary relationship between managerial communication and managerial engagement predicted in 
Hypothesis 5b.     
4.2. Robustness Tests  
4.2.1 Scope of Staff-reported Problem Solving. A potential concern with our analysis is that our 
dependent variables do not distinguish between types of problem solving actions. Whereas some problem 
                                                      
8 Wald tests confirmed that the coefficient on Managerial Engagement during awareness campaign and Managerial 
Engagement not during awareness campaign significantly differed from each other in the logit model (Model 2 
reported in Table 4: χ
2= 2.84; p<0.10) and negative binomial model (Model 4 reported in Table 4: χ
2= 4.89; p<0.05).  
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solving actions address only specific operational failures, others attempt to prevent the occurrence of 
similar incidents. To determine whether the relationships observed in our main analysis were robust to 
this distinction, we categorized each problem solving action as either “narrow problem solving” or 
possessing the “potential for broad problem solving.” “Narrow” actions attempt to restore the situation 
(including patients, frontline workers, equipment, and the environment) to the pre-incident state, or 
prevent the identical incident from occurring, or both, and might prevent similar incidents from occurring 
through notification of specific frontline workers such as attending physicians about an incident. 
“Potential for broad” actions include those more likely to prevent future incidents. These consist of 
actions that involved notifying individuals capable of addressing a failure’s cause, including senior 
administrators and frontline workers in other departments, about an incident, repairing a piece of 
equipment, or changing a policy.   
We created a categorical variable with three levels of scope of staff-reported problem solving, 
“no problem solving” for incidents with which no problem solving actions were associated (76% of 
incidents), “narrow problem solving” for incidents with which only narrow actions were associated (2%), 
and “potential for broad problem solving” for incidents with which at least one associated action had the 
potential for broader problem solving (22%). We then estimated a multinomial logistic regression model 
with scope of staff-reported problem solving as the dependent variable, predicted by the same set of 
independent and control variables included in our main model. The results (not shown to conserve space) 
indicate that all of our independent variables were just as likely to prompt narrow problem solving as to 
prompt problem solving with the potential for a broad response.
9  
4.2.2 Additional Incident Types. Although our main analysis focused on the four incident types 
for which underreporting of actions was rare in order to minimize measurement error, we also estimated 
our logistic and negative binomial models using data for all incident types to determine whether 
relationships revealed in our main results are observed in the broader sample of 11,930 incidents across 
                                                      
9 Specifically, we used Wald tests to assess the equality of the multinomial logistic regression coefficients across the 
“deep” and “shallow” categories. We found no statistically significant difference between the likelihood of shallow 
versus deep problem solving for all of our independent variables.    
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thirteen incident types.
10 Despite the noise introduced by underreporting of actions, these results (not 
shown to conserve space) are largely consistent with our main results. We emphasize that these results are 
unbiased only under the key assumption that the underreporting of actions more prevalent in this broader 
sample is uncorrelated with the error term in each of the models (i.e., with the relationships between the 
independent variables and the propensity to engage in problem solving). In our logit model predicting any 
staff-reported problem solving, odds ratios were of similar magnitude as our main results, except that the 
odds ratio on awareness campaign was now much lower and no longer statistically significant (OR=1.05; 
p=0.68). This could be due to the higher volume of incident reports filed during campaigns (described 
below), which exacerbated the underreporting of actions in the broader array of incident types (i.e., 
frontline workers might be more likely to underreport actions when they are filling out more reports per 
day and presumably spending less time on each). Comparing the results with those of our count model 
predicting number of staff-reported problem solving actions revealed a similar pattern. Incidence-rate 
ratios were of the same magnitude and significance, except that the IRR on campaign, which was not 
significant in our main results, was now significant, with fewer problem solving actions taken during 
campaign periods (IRR=0.83; p<0.05). We favor the same interpretation, that underreporting of actions in 
the incident reporting system was likely exacerbated during campaigns, making the number of actions 
taken in response to incidents during campaigns appear lower.   
4.2.3 Data Errors. One potential source of measurement error in our data is that incidents are 
reported with varying time lags from when they occurred. Data censoring might confound our measures 
of problem solving if reports filed sooner after an incident recorded fewer problem solving actions due to 
too little elapsed time to enable the reporter to record all relevant actions. To assess the validity of this 
concern, we compared the number of reported problem solving actions for incidents reported more 
quickly versus those reported more slowly, splitting the sample at the median (50
th percentile) reporting 
                                                      
10 The incident reporting system includes fifteen incident types, but we exclude two, those related to adverse drug 
events or medication/intravenous issues, because the hospital tracks the resolution of these types of incidents with 
supplementary databases to which we did not have access.  
23 
lag in our data (one day). A t-test yielded no evidence that incidents reported more quickly had fewer 
reported actions, allaying this potential concern.
11  
4.3. Extensions  
4.3.1 The Likelihood of Management-reported Problem Solving. Although the primary focus 
of our analysis is on frontline problem solving (reported by frontline workers), our dataset also enabled us 
to explore factors associated with management-reported problem solving. The role of managers in 
problem solving differs from that of frontline workers, and has been an important topic of study (Weiner, 
Shortell, and Alexander 1997). For example, Lee (1993) found that managers learn about operational 
failures not by direct observation but by receiving second-hand reports, typically transmitted after 
frontline workers have taken immediate actions. Another difference is that managers possess capabilities 
for problem solving that frontline workers lack including the ability to authorize resources (Shortell et al. 
1995) and span unit boundaries and shifts (Tushman and Scanlon 1981). Thus, actions taken by managers 
to resolve operational failures often differ from those taken by frontline workers.   
We created a variable to capture problem solving activities reported by managers based on the 
incident reporting system’s “action” field, which was accessible only to managers. Actions reported in 
this field capture activities conducted at a broader, institutional level. We created any management-
reported problem solving as a dichotomous variable coded “1” for incidents in which at least one action 
was taken by a manager in response to the incident, and “0” otherwise. For the same subset of incidents in 
the primary results reported above, 16% resulted in at least one manager-reported action. The results of 
our logistic regression model predicting any management-reported problem solving are presented in 
Column 1 of Table 5. Management problem solving was significantly more likely to occur when incidents 
posed financial risk (OR=17.3; p<0.01) or involved a patient (OR=1.3; p<0. 10) or equipment (OR=2.2; 
p<0.01). Management problem solving was significantly less likely to occur for incidents associated with 
obstetrics risk (OR=0.072; p<0.01), which might be due to unit managers escalating these incidents for 
                                                      
11 Splitting the sample at the 75
th percentile of the reporting lag in our sample (2 days) and 90
th percentile (5 days) 
yielded identical results.  
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follow-up by the those in the hospital’s risk management department, whose actions are not captured in 
our dataset. Although we find no evidence that awareness campaigns affected the likelihood of managers 
investing effort in problem solving (OR=1.04; p=0.82), it is important to consider the broader context to 
avoid misinterpreting this result. A t-test across the broader set of thirteen incident types indicated that 
significantly more incidents were reported during or shortly after campaigns (14.4 versus 13.3 incidents 
per day across all incident types; p<0.05). Thus, whereas our regression results indicate that the 
proportion of incidents to which managers responded was indistinguishable between campaign and non-
campaign periods,
12 applying this proportion to a greater number of reported incidents means that 
managers responded to a higher number of incidents per day during campaigns, 2.6 incidents per day 
during campaigns versus 2.3 during other periods across all incident types, a statistically significant 
difference (p<0.10 according to a t-test that compared these daily counts). 
4.3.2 The Scope of Management-reported Problem Solving. We also explored the 
circumstances under which management actions were more likely to improve future operational 
performance. Managers’ actions were considered “narrow problem solving” if they targeted a single 
incident, patient, or frontline worker, and therefore less likely to prevent similar incidents in the future. 
Examples include “care plan modified” and “feedback given to reporter.” Managers’ actions classified as 
“potential for broad problem solving,” such as “environment modified” and “policy/procedure instituted,” 
targeted multiple incidents, patients, or frontline workers, and were more likely to eliminate the root cause 
of the incident. Managers’ actions were coded by the authors independently and discrepancies jointly 
resolved. Incidents were coded at the highest level of manager action. Accordingly, we created scope of 
management-reported problem solving as a categorical variable coded “no problem solving” for 
incidents with no associated manager actions (84% of incidents), “narrow problem solving” for incidents 
                                                      
12 A t-test indicated that managers responded to an average of 17.5% incidents per day during awareness campaigns 
versus 17.1% during other times of the year, a difference that was not statistically significant (p=0.69).  
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with only narrow associated manager actions (2%), and “potential for broad problem solving” for 
incidents with at least one such associated manager action (14%).
13   
We estimated a model that predicts this categorical variable using multinomial logistic regression. 
Results are presented in Columns 2a and 2b of Table 5 as relative risk ratios (RRR), the baseline category 
being “no actions.” Wald tests assessed whether the independent variables had a significant impact on the 
choice between “shallow problem solving” and “deep problem solving” by testing whether the 
coefficients on these categories were equal. We focus our interpretation of the results on two interesting 
findings in which the independent variables have significantly different effects on the likelihood of 
shallow versus deep problem solving. For incidents that posed financial risk, deep management problem 
solving was significantly more likely than shallow management problem solving (i.e., the relative risk 
ratios differed significantly; χ
2=14.68; p<0.01). This large difference might reflect managers’ greater 
discretion in allocating time and effort between profitable and not profitable services as wall as the 
likelihood that other resources might flow in greater abundance to more profitable services. Managerial 
awareness campaigns seemed to deter shallow management problem solving (RRR=0.32; p<0.01), a 
result we found surprising. In contrast, we found no evidence that these campaigns influenced the 
likelihood of deep problem solving relative to no problem solving. It is possible that the higher volume of 
incidents reported during campaigns required managers to engage in a form of triage that led them to 
prioritize opportunities to take deeper actions to address multiple incidents. 
5. Discussion  
  Addressing and preventing operational failures has the potential to improve organizational 
performance (Tucker 2004). Incident reporting systems are designed to facilitate process improvement by 
systematically capturing operational failures. But little is known about the extent to which organizations 
use incident reports for problem solving, which incidents trigger frontline problem solving, and whether 
                                                      
13 We were unable to classify into our typology 27% of manager actions (10 of 37) such as loss of reputation and 
cost incurred. As a result, when an incident had one or more manager actions none of which we could classify, we 
coded depth of management-reported problem solving as missing. This resulted in 17 incidents for which we were 
unable to classify problem solving actions as shallow or deep.  
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managers can promote more problem solving among frontline personnel. We examined the latter two 
questions in the health care context, in which operational failures are common and potentially 
catastrophic and solving problems to improve processes is one of the industry’s highest priorities.   
Our research demonstrates that both incident characteristics and managerial behavior affect 
problem solving behavior among frontline workers. With respect to incident characteristics, we 
hypothesized that workers would engage in more problem solving when operational failures risked 
financial harm or legal liability. We found evidence that incidents associated with liability concerns 
prompted more problem solving actions. This finding is consistent with MacDuffie’s (1997) observation 
that Honda expected its frontline autoworkers to prioritize their problem solving efforts towards problems 
more likely to trigger customer concerns. Whereas dissatisfaction with quality in the automotive context 
is often registered via complaints, dissatisfaction in hospitals is often expressed by filing lawsuits. In both 
cases, deterring the threat of these complaints is associated with greater frontline problem solving. Future 
research is required to determine the extent to which the threat of customer dissatisfaction drives frontline 
problem solving in other contexts. 
Financial risk spurred problem solving among managers, but not frontline workers. There are 
several potential explanations for this finding. First, managers might be more sensitive than frontline 
workers to the financial implications of serving profitable patients. Alternatively, it is possible that 
frontline workers do respond to financial risk, but do so by undertaking qualitatively different types of 
problem solving, rather than more problem solving. For example, staff members might spend more time 
instructing a patient by demonstrating rather than quickly explaining a behavior. We were unable to 
evaluate such potential differences in the time and resources devoted to each action.   
We also hypothesized that management commitment to problem solving would encourage 
problem solving among frontline workers. We focused on two manifestations of management 
commitment: managerial communication through awareness campaigns, and managerial engagement 
through modeling of problem solving behavior. We found frontline workers in units in which managers 
engaged in more problem solving to be more likely to conduct problem solving in response to reported  
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incidents. Our finding that managers serving as role models can affect workers’ discretionary efforts to 
improve processes is consistent with findings of a previous study that workers whose managers 
emphasized safety by discussing it more often with their subordinates engaged in safer work practices 
(Zohar 2002a).   
We also found frontline workers whose managers promoted frontline problem solving via an 
awareness campaign to be more likely to conduct problem solving in response to reported incidents. Our 
empirical context did not, however, enable us to determine the duration that maximizes the effectiveness 
of awareness campaigns. If novelty drives salience and, therefore, action, effectiveness might diminish if 
campaigns are run for extended periods or repeated frequently. Further research is required to understand 
how campaign length or frequency affects salience as well as the conditions under which campaigns 
occasion temporary versus enduring increases in frontline problem solving. Although awareness 
campaigns promoted frontline problem solving, they did not affect the number of problem solving actions 
taken. This finding might stem from exacerbation of underreporting of actions in the incident reporting 
system during campaigns, making the number of actions taken in response to incidents during campaigns 
appear lower. But it might also reflect the challenge of thoroughly resolving operational failures when a 
higher volume of problems is exposed. This interpretation sounds a cautionary note in that sporadic 
awareness campaigns do not ensure capacity for adequate action. Superficial response can contribute to 
what Bohn (2000) has described as a “firefighing climate.” An emphasis on problem solving without a 
commensurate increase in resources to help frontline workers take action to resolve problems thoroughly 
could thwart their efforts, despite a desire to respond to managers’ appeals. Absent sufficient capacity to 
address problems, awareness campaigns could frustrate workers and add to skepticism about 
management’s commitment to problem solving.   
Our findings also suggest that managerial communication and engagement, the two forms of 
management commitment studied, appear to substitute for rather than complement one another. 
Specifically, managerial awareness campaigns provoke more problem solving among frontline workers 
whose managers routinely engage in lower levels of problem solving. This result might be heartening to  
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managers unable to devote the time they would like to demonstrate their commitment through the 
modeling of problem solving behavior. Understanding why awareness campaigns do not increase 
frontline worker problem solving in units with higher levels of managerial engagement is an area for 
future research. Perhaps the higher volume of incident reports filed during awareness campaigns makes it 
difficult for highly engaged managers to devote more time to resolving incidents, and thereby deters 
frontline workers in these areas from engaging in more problem solving.   
Despite recognition that studying operational failures has the potential to promote operational 
improvement, prior research has not considered the types of reported incidents that trigger problem 
solving. Our study provides the first evidence that certain types of incidents systematically promote more 
problem solving than others. Whereas prior research indicates that a learning orientation leads to fewer 
problems (Stern, Katz-Navon, and Naveh 2008), our results show that incident characteristics and 
management commitment might also influence the occurrence of learning.     
5.1 Contributions to Theory and Practice. In addition to contributing to the literature on 
incident reporting, our study extends the literature on the benefits of problem solving for process 
improvement. Our research focused on when problem solving occurs and how managers can promote it. 
Research about the Toyota Production System has described organizations the practices of which support 
rapid and nearly universal response to operational failures (Spear and Bowen 1999). But the problem 
solving literature says little about when workers engage in problem solving in organizations that do not 
adhere to such strict standards. 
Tucker and Edmondson (2003) distinguished two types of problem solving based on whether 
frontline workers simply worked around the immediate problem (first order problem solving) or also 
attempted to resolve the problem by calling attention to it (second order problem solving). They found 
that frontline workers engaged in second order problem solving for just 7% of problems. While focusing 
exclusively on second order problem solving (as all incident reports call attention to problems), our 
findings reveal particular characteristics of incidents and the contexts in which they occur that are 
associated with more frontline problem solving. In doing so, our results promote a better understanding of  
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frontline workers’ potential to improve processes and mitigate operational failures. By identifying 
particular features and contexts of incidents that are less likely to spur problem solving, our results also 
highlight a heightened need for other approaches to address incidents less likely to pose liability or 
financial risks. 
Our study also provides a better understanding of the ways frontline workers address operational 
failures. Tucker and Edmondson (2003) investigated problem solving following two types of failures: 
problems and errors, which they distinguished based on the underlying cause of the failure. We focused 
on a different categorization of failures based on their consequences. Together, these papers begin to 
build a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics of operational failures that promote problem 
solving. We introduce an important distinction within Tucker and Edmondson’s (2003) category of 
second order problem solving based on the scope of problem solving. Specifically, our database contained 
instances of narrow and broad problem solving, the latter affording greater opportunity for operational 
performance improvement. We also found both types of problem solving to occur at different levels 
within the organization, that is, among frontline workers and managers. Additional research to more fully 
develop a typology of problem solving at all organizational levels would be beneficial.   
Our study also contributes to the problem solving literature by focusing on the role managers can 
play in promoting problem solving. Our findings suggest that managerial awareness campaigns can 
interrupt periods of inertia and create windows of opportunity for problem solving related to operational 
failures, a pattern others have identified in the problem solving that accompanies adoption of new 
technologies (Gersick 1988; Tyre and Orlikowski 1994). We found awareness campaigns to be 
particularly effective at spurring problem solving in organizational units characterized by low managerial 
engagement in problem solving. This introduces an important contingency regarding the circumstances 
under which such “windows of opportunity” (Tyre and Orlikowski 1994) and “punctuated equilibriums” 
(Gersick 1988) might be particularly likely to emerge. It also suggests that these two forms of managerial 
commitment serve primarily as substitutes and not complements. Thus, whereas managerial consistency 
might be important (Kopelman et al. 1990, Rogg et al. 2001), its benefits might be limited in situations in  
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which the potential for extra effort is limited. Alternatively, this discrepancy might be explained by a 
distinction among levels of management. In our context, managerial communication and managerial 
engagement were enacted by different types of managers (senior managers and line managers, 
respectively). It might be that managerial consistency matters within a given level of management or for a 
given manager, but different forms of commitment work as substitutes across levels. Additional 
exploration is needed to flesh out such distinctions. 
Finally, our study has implications for the extensive literature that examines and seeks to identify 
ways to mitigate the substantial underreporting of incidents in the presence of incident reporting systems. 
For example, according to Vincent (2006: 61), incident reporting systems can be an effective tool for 
mitigating problems only if those responsible for reporting incidents “see it is worthwhile . . . [and] if not 
then there are always reasons why this or that incident does not need to be reported.” By highlighting a 
positive association between the extent to which frontline staff and their managers engage in problem 
solving activities, our results highlight the possibility that greater levels of managerial engagement in 
problem solving might spur frontline workers to report a greater proportion of incidents as well as near 
misses.  
Our study also provides insights for managers. Our results reveal characteristics of incidents that 
are particularly likely to prompt frontline workers to engage in problem solving. Managers now can 
assess the extent to which frontline workers’ prioritization of these types of incidents aligns with 
organizational objectives and develop strategies to encourage problem solving among types of incidents 
for which problem solving is less than optimal. Our findings also highlight two strategies managers can 
employ to influence problem solving behavior among frontline workers, specifically, demonstrating, 
through words and actions, their commitment to problem solving. Managers could signal, for example, 
the appropriateness of learning from near misses by engaging in problem solving following near misses as 
if they were reportable incidents or by calling for such a response in an awareness campaign.     
5.2 Limitations and Future Research. This study has several limitations. Our hospital has made 
a substantial effort to promote patient safety via an array of approaches. Although this raises some  
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concern about generalizability, findings in this setting define what can be expected in hospitals that 
dedicate resources to improving patient safety via incident reporting, and identify areas in which hospitals 
with mature patient safety programs can improve the use of existing incident reporting systems. 
We determined, as reported above, that the rate of incident reporting at this hospital is similar to 
statewide rates. Further, academic medical centers, being highly complex institutions, are often compared 
to industries such as aviation that also require highly reliable results (Gaba 2000). We also had to consider 
the unique structure of the health care industry, which forced us to define profitable services based on 
decisions made by customers’ doctors. This could impair generalizability, given that in most industries 
customers themselves make decisions about where to conduct business. Similarly, one of our measures of 
legal liability captured patients’ involvement in incidents. In an industry in which frontline workers are 
trained first and foremost to “do no harm,” incidents involving patients evoke not only liability risk but an 
emotional response that might prompt problem solving, which we could not disentangle, but provides an 
opportunity for future research. Future work could also examine how various risks associated with 
incidents affect frontline problem solving in other industries in which customers make direct decisions 
(e.g., airlines) and emotional stakes are lower. 
Many scholars have described how organizational culture affects incident reporting (Waring 
2005; Cooke, Dunscombe, and Lee 2007), dedication to quality improvement (Carman et al. 1996), and 
safety outcomes (McFadden, Henagan and Gowen 2009; Singer et al. 2009). Our empirical context was 
confined to a single hospital, which enabled us to control for hospital-level culture. Prior research, 
however, has revealed that work groups within hospitals can exhibit significantly different cultures that 
influence the propensity for individuals to report incidents (Edmondson 2004; Naveh, Katz-Navon, and 
Stern 2006) and likelihood of successfully implementing process improvements (Tucker, Nembhard, and 
Edmondson 2007). Confidentiality restrictions that accompanied our data access prevented us from 
examining intra-organizational differences in culture that might affect incident reporting and problem 
solving. Future research could examine how organizational culture affects problem solving in response to  
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reported incidents across several organizations as well as within different departments within the same 
organization.  
We also advocate for linking our focus on the determinants of problem solving to the 
phenomenon of underreporting, which has been examined in much prior research on incident reporting. 
Indeed, among many causes of underreporting is concern about the futility of reporting owing to a 
perception that little if any problem solving would actually follow a reported incident (Ghandi et al. 
2005). Similarly, frontline workers have stated that more evidence linking incident reports to system 
changes would increase the likelihood of reporting incidents (Taylor et al. 2004; Evans et al. 2006).  
Studies could test whether more visible problem solving following incidents does, in fact, lead to more 
incident reporting, perhaps focusing on the types of incidents managers are most concerned are 
underreported.     
6. Conclusion 
This study is the first quantitative analysis of which reported operational failures are more likely to 
promote problem solving. Our findings provide evidence that supports the theory that problem solving in 
response to operational failures is influenced by both the risk posed by the incident and the extent to 
which management demonstrates a commitment to problem solving. By explaining some of the variation 
in responsiveness, this study empowers managers to adjust their approach to problem solving. Although 
we explored the characteristics of operational failures associated with problem solving, the present study 
did not determine whether organizations actually learn from the incidents to which they respond, and did 
not assess the effectiveness of responses. Future research should assess the extent to which incident 
reporting systems occasion reductions in operational failures. 
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Table 1. Incident Types 
 
Incident type  Definition  Percent of incidents of this type 
  
Blood/Blood Product  Incident related to the prescribing, 
processing, dispensing, or administration 




Incident related to identification, chart 
documentation of consent, etc. that is not a 
contributing factor to another incident type.
11% 
Lab Specimen/Test  Incident related to ordering, preparation, 
performance, or results of a lab 
specimen/test. 
28% 
Surgery/Procedure  Incident related to ordering, preparation, or 
performance of a surgical procedure or 
anesthesia.   
14% 
   Total  =  7,407 
Note: Incident type definitions were provided by the hospital.   
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean SD  Min Max 
Any staff-reported problem solving  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Number of staff-reported problem solving actions  0.33  0.76  0  8 
Any management-reported problem solving  0.16  0.36  0  1 
Profitable service   0.11  0.32  0  1 
Legal liability concern – patient present  0.89  0.31  0  1 
Legal liability concern – obstetrics  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Awareness campaign  0.22  0.41  0  1 
Managerial engagement  0.21  0.26  0  1 
Patient or clinical area  0.11  0.31  0  1 
Temporary patient harm  0.03  0.17  0  1 
Permanent patient harm  0.00  0.05  0  1 
Patient death  0.00  0.03  0  1 
Equipment involved  0.04  0.20  0  1 
Profitability of unit in which incident occurred not known  0.71  0.45  0  1 
Manager engagement of unit in which incident occurred not known  0.02  0.12  0  1 
Area in which incident occurred not specified in the incident report  0.87  0.34  0  1 




Table 3. Correlations 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13 
1  Any  staff-reported  problem  solving  1.00             
2  Number of staff-reported problem
solving actions 
0.76 1.00            
3  Any management-reported problem
solving 
-0.06 -0.04 1.00           
4  Profitable  service    -0.01 -0.02 0.15 1.00          
5  Legal liability concern – patient  present  0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 1.00         
6  Legal liability concern - obstetrics  0.11 0.08 -0.13 0.04 0.03 1.00        
7  Awareness  campaign  0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00       
8  Managerial engagement  -0.08 -0.06 0.46 0.34 0.11 -0.17 -0.02 1.00      
9  Patient or clinical area  0.12 0.30 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 1.00      
10 Temporary patient harm  0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.16  1.00     
11 Permanent patient harm  0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 1.00     
12 Patient death  0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00  0.00 1.00  
13 Equipment involved  -0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.26 0.09  0.02  -0.01 1.00 




Staff-Reported Problem Solving:  
Logistic and Negative Binomial Regression Results 
   (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b) 
 Dependent  variable  Any staff-reported  
problem solving actions 
Number of staff-reported 
problem solving actions 
    Logit  Negative binomial 
   Odds ratios  Incidence-rate ratios 
H1 Financial  risk  0.707** 0.702**  0.859*  0.854* 
   [0.106] [0.105] [0.079] [0.078] 
H2  Legal liability risk – patient present  3.528*** 3.544*** 1.907*** 1.908*** 
   [0.497] [0.500] [0.224] [0.224] 
H2  Legal liability risk – obstetrics  1.453***  1.458***  1.363***  1.365*** 
    [0.168] [0.168] [0.100] [0.100] 
H3 Awareness  campaign  1.541**  1.710***  1.056  1.151 
    [0.272] [0.320] [0.143] [0.163] 
H4 Managerial  engagement  1.761***    1.556***   
   [0.289]    [0.173]   
H5a  Managerial engagement during     1.067    0.994 
 awareness  campaign   [0.378]   [0.235] 
H5b  Managerial engagement  not during    2.015***    1.745*** 
 awareness  campaign   [0.351]   [0.210] 
  Patient or clinical area  1.646  1.653  1.317  1.329 
    [0.591] [0.593] [0.275] [0.276] 
 Temporary  patient  harm    1.369 1.367  1.645***  1.641*** 
    [0.346] [0.345] [0.281] [0.280] 
  Permanent patient harm  1.615  1.648  1.211  1.229 
    [1.271] [1.297] [0.689] [0.696] 
 Patient  death  1.076 1.065 0.594 0.585 
    [0.751] [0.752] [0.197] [0.200] 
  Equipment  involved  0.907 0.91 1.044  1.046 
    [0.248] [0.248] [0.180] [0.180] 
  Incident type fixed effects   Included  Included  Included  Included 
  Month fixed effects   Included  Included  Included  Included 
  Year fixed effects  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 Observations  7,407 7,407 7,407 7,407 
 Log  likelihood  -2,138 -2,136 -4,279 -4,277 
  Model  Wald  Chi-squared  1,136*** 1,141*** 1,498*** 1,516*** 
  McFadden’s  R-squared  0.48 0.48 0.22 0.22 
  Mean dependent variable in this sample 0.24  0.24  0.33  0.33 
  Predicted probability at mean of all 
variables   0.24  0.24 
0.35 0.35 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All models include a dummy variable (managerial 
engagement undetermined) designating incidents that took place in units with no reported incidents in the prior year, a dummy 
variable (profitability undetermined) to indicate incidents for which the profitability of the unit in which the incident occurred 
could not be determined, and a dummy variable designating that the area in which the incident occurred was not reported. 
Likelihood ratio tests indicated that addition of the interaction term significantly improved the model fit for Model 2b compared 
to Model 2a  (χ
2= 4.90; p<0.05) and marginally improved the model fit for Model 1b compared to Model 1a (χ
2= 2.52; p<0.11).    
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Table 5.  
Management-Reported Problem Solving:  
Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Results 
  
 (1)  (2a)  (2b)  (2c) 




Scope of management-reported problem 
solving  
 Logit  Multinomial  logit 
  Odds ratios  Relative risk ratios  Wald test 










Financial risk  17.284***  3.649***  23.656***  14.68*** 
 [3.454]  [1.599]  [5.413]   
Legal liability risk – patient present  1.287*  1.404  1.310*  0.04 
 [0.186]  [0.471]  [0.213]   
Legal liability risk – obstetrics  0.072***  0.063***  0.073***  0.02 
 [0.024]  [0.062]  [0.026]   
Awareness campaign  1.037  0.321***  1.306  9.75*** 
 [0.159]  [0.138]  [0.217]   
Patient or clinical area  1.141  3.076*  0.867  3.26* 
 [0.320]  [2.009]  [0.275]   
Temporary patient harm   1.143  1.561  0.858  1.85 
 [0.239]  [0.621]  [0.211]   
Permanent patient harm  2.923  0.000***  0.972  652.40*** 
 [2.751]  [0.000]  [1.232]   
Patient death    0.000***  0.000***  2.78* 
   [0.000]  [0.000]   
Equipment involved  2.192***  1.718  2.768***  0.57 
 [0.560]  [0.975]  [0.825]   
Incident type fixed effects   Included  Included     
Month fixed effects        Included  Included   
Year fixed effects  Included  Included   
Observations 7,402  7,385†   
Log likelihood  -2,767  -3,089   
Model Wald Chi-squared  527***  8,170***   
McFadden’s R-squared  0.14  0.15     
Mean dependent variable in this sample  0.16       
 
In Columns 2a and 2b, the relative risk ratios are relative to “no actions,” the baseline category. Column 2c reports the chi-
squared statistic of a Wald test of the equality of coefficients from Columns 2a and 2b; a statistically significant result indicates 
that the coefficients differ. Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Both models also include a 
dummy variable (profitability undetermined) to indicate incidents for which the profitability of the unit in which the incident 
occurred could not be determined, and a dummy variable designating that the area in which the incident occurred was not 
reported.  
† The slightly smaller sample in Model 2 is due to our excluding 17 incidents for which we were unable to classify problem 
solving actions as shallow or deep.    
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Figure 1.   Predicted Probability of Staff-Reported Problem Solving  
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This graph depicts the predicted probability of any staff-reported problem solving at various levels of managerial engagement 
(from 0% to 100% plotted in increments of 5%) during campaign periods (solid line) and outside of campaign periods (dashed 
line), when all other variables were held at their means. 
 